FDMS
INTELLIGENCE

Analysis of CIA Document HVCA 2592 Suggesting That Hitler Survived World War II



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1. Executive Summary

This report analyzes a declassified CIA routing memo HVCA 2592 from October 1955 concerning a field intelligence claim that Adolf Hitler survived World War II, lived in Colombia and later Argentina, and remained alive as late as 1955. The document centers around a photographic "sighting" and the testimony of a former German SS officer allegedly named *CITROEN*.

While sensational in nature, the CIA explicitly characterized the report as unverified and "fantastic," forwarding it without any endorsement or conclusion. No evidence supporting the claim was validated. Nevertheless, internal routing shows the report was taken seriously enough to be circulated widely across Latin American field stations.

2. Document Summary

Key Details:

- Date: 3 October 1955
- Source: CIA station memo based on field intelligence from *CIMELODY-3*, who reported that a former German SS officer (*CITROEN*) claimed Adolf Hitler was alive in Colombia and had moved to Argentina in early 1955.
- Evidence Cited: A surreptitiously obtained photograph labeled 'Adolf Hitler, Mayor, Tunga, Colombia, 1954.'
- CIA's Assessment: No validation was offered; the report was simply passed along as 'of possible interest.'

3. Analytical Context

1. Credibility Issues:
    - The report is built entirely on second and third-hand hearsay.
    - The CIA agent on record acknowledged they were 'not in a position to evaluate' the claim and characterized it as 'fantastic.'
    - No technical analysis, corroborative testimony, or further investigative leads were documented—just a circulated photo and a colorful anecdote.

2. Historical Intelligence Culture:

    - In the postwar years, particularly during the early Cold War, U.S. intelligence was saturated with leads on fugitive Nazis. Many of these were credible—like Eichmann's confirmed escape to Argentina—but others were wild and unsubstantiated.
    - This period saw an epidemic of disinformation, especially from émigré networks, opportunists, and hostile intelligence services looking to sow confusion.

4. Likely a Soviet Active Measure

This case bears the classic fingerprints of a KGB active measure—a type of strategic deception operation designed not to win with facts but to confuse, distract, and exhaust.

- Tactic: Sow a rumor just credible enough to force CIA stations to divert time, funds, and personnel to investigate it.
- Strategic Goal: Erode confidence in CIA intelligence-gathering processes, clutter internal communication channels, and bog down field offices with phantom targets.
- Why Hitler? Few narratives are more captivating or disruptive than the idea that the most hunted man in modern history managed to escape justice. By keeping that ember alive, Soviet disinformation could play both on American guilt (for potentially missing him) and pride (in hoping to be the ones to find him).
- Dissemination: By pushing the rumor through Latin American intermediaries, émigré Germans, and vaguely defined SS veterans, the Soviets could exploit postwar Nazi migration trails—many of which were real, thus giving the rumor a patina of plausibility.

This technique mirrors other known Soviet operations like:

- The Operation INFEKTION campaign falsely suggested the U.S. created AIDS.
- Forgeries placing Nazi war criminals in American employment to strain U.S.-European relations.
- Psychological operations targeted at West German and Latin American press, using forged documents and whispered rumors.

5. Conclusion

Rather than a revelation, this document should be read as an artifact of Cold War strategic psychological warfare. It represents not evidence of Hitler's survival but evidence of how effectively rumor and myth were weaponized—turning intelligence agencies into unwitting actors in the geopolitical theater. The truth wasn't the target. The hunt itself was the point.

Far from providing credible proof that Hitler escaped justice, this case exemplifies a Cold War-era disinformation trap. The document bears strong hallmarks of a Soviet active measure, likely intended to confuse, distract, and drain U.S. intelligence assets.

The extensive internal processing of this dubious report—by over a dozen personnel—illustrates just how effective the Soviet deception campaign was. By activating latent fears and historical anxieties, the Soviets successfully caused the CIA to chase shadows.

In short, the report stands not as evidence of Hitler's survival but as evidence of Soviet success in weaponizing myth and rumor to manipulate U.S. intelligence during a critical period of the Cold War.

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 5 Oct 55

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

TELEPHONE

NO. HVCA-2592

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. WH Barton Haac	046		13 OCT 1955			*Hitler, Adolph cc; chrono detached
2. I		OCT 1955 14	OCT 1955 14		Logged	
3. Llenkum		19 Oct 55		AKD		2-3- ~~[illegible]~~
4. Bacon		OCT 1955 17	OCT 1955 17			~~[illegible]~~
5. Stoddard						Nanecheckes on CITROEN and SCHOTTELMAYER negative. Schüttelmayer
6.						
7. Colombel Boisleu		19 Oct 55				
8.						
9. H/II argentina		24 X 24				
10.						
11. EE/ Klemensy/II	OCT 1955 26	OCT 26 1955 EWI				
12. EE/ of FL		NOV 8 1955 2/11				
13. R.H.						
14. INDEX CS COPY.						
15. RI/FI NOV 1955 9	1409 L					

11-12: HAVE FUN &
13: may not be continuing

201 93533

ABSTRACT X INDEX X

DATE 10 OCT 1955

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1963
DOC. MICRO.

FORM NO. 1 APR 55 610 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

(40)

NLC-000037

DB-1497

VIA: Air (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO.

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

HVCA-2592

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 3 October 1955

FROM : Acting Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO: Bogotá
Buenos Aires
Maracaibo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Adolph HITLER

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. On 29 September 1955, fairly reliable CIMELODY-3 reported the following. Neither CIMELODY-3 nor this Station is in a position to give an intelligent evaluation of the information and it is being forwarded as of possible interest.

2. CIMELODY-3 was contacted on 29 September 1955 by a trusted friend who served under his command in Europe and who is presently residing in Maracaibo. CIMELODY-3 preferred not to reveal the identity of his friend.

3. CIMELODY-3's friend stated that during the latter part of September 1955, a Phillip CITROEN, former German SS trooper, stated to him confidentially that Adolph HITLER is still alive. CITROEN claimed to have contacted HITLER about once a month in Colombia on his trip from Maracaibo to that country as an employee of the KNSM (Royal Dutch) Shipping Co. in Maracaibo. CITROEN indicated to CIMELODY-3's friend that he took a picture with HITLER not too long ago, but did not show the photograph. He also stated that HITLER left Colombia for Argentina around January 1955. CITROEN commented that inasmuch as ten years have passed since the end of World War II, the Allies could no longer prosecute HITLER as a criminal of war.

4. On 28 September 1955, CIMELODY-3's friend surreptitiously obtained the photograph which CITROEN referred to. On 29 September 1955, the photo was shown to CIMELODY-3 for purposes of getting his reaction to the possible veracity of this fantastic story. Obviously, CIMELODY-3 was not in any position to make any comments. Nonetheless, he borrowed the photograph long enough so that this Station could take any action deemed advisable. Photostats of this picture were taken, and are being forwarded. The photograph was to be returned to its owner the following day. The person on the left is alleged to be CITROEN and the person on the right is undoubtedly the person which CITROEN claims is HITLER. The back side of the photograph contained the following data: "Adolf SCHRITTELMAYOR, Tunga, Colombia, 1954."

1 Att. w/w

David N. Brixnor

DNB/lac
Attachment: 1 photo
3 October 1955
3 - Headquarters, w/1 att. in dupl.
1 - Bogotá, w/1 att., 1 copy
1 - Buenos Aires, w/1 att., 1 copy
1 - Maracaibo, w/1 attl, 1 copy
2 - Files, w/1 att., 1 copy

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CS COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A MAR. 1949

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

3 Oct 55
HVCA 2592
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MICROFILMED
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DOC. MICRO. SER.



Adolf Schüttelmaier
Columbia. Tunga.
America del Sur. 1954/55.

30 Oct 59
201-93573
AOA 4/71 NVCA 2592